Tournament of Champions recap

Tonight was the Tournament of Champions (TOC) for one of the groups that I’ve been playing with this year. I don’t know if I’ll have a chance to write up a full recap, but here’s a brief summary:

I was basically card dead all night. That being said, I did pick up a few nice hands, but I never got any action on them. I had AK once and took the pot down with a re-raise pre-flop. I had AA twice, QQ, JJ twice and 33; I didn’t get any action with any of those hands. I busted with AJ vs. K5s when my opponent tried to make a move and I picked him off. Here’s that hand (it was one of the most interesting of the night):

We were three-handed at the 500/1000 level and I started with about 15K chips (I’d been hovering around 15K for a couple hours) and I was the BB. The button limped, the SB folded and I raised to 4K with AJo. The button moved in pretty quickly and I called before he had his chips in the pot. He showed K5o, the flop was AKK and IGHN. The SB said that he had also folded K5o.

That was pretty much it. My best hand of the night was a King-high straight that I made in the first level for a very small pot. I never had trips. I never had two pair. I think I flopped top pair once or twice (once, I had to fold to a raise by a guy who flopped a flush). I made some very good laydowns and some excellent reads. Most of the pots I won were pure bluffs. Once we were three-handed, every pot I won post-flop was a bluff.

I finished 3/10 for $600. I also played a $10 last longer against four other guys and I won that. The prize pool was $2500 and we each put in $50 more to make it $3000. We played for about 5.5 hours.

All in all, I was very satisfied with my play. I doubt I could’ve played any better. I was disappointed to finish third, but that’s just the way the cards fell. I was only all-in once and the best hand didn’t win. As I look back on the year, I’m floored by how far I’ve come as a tournament poker player. I thought I was decent back in January, but I just didn’t have a lot of live experience. I think I’ve played about 100 hours of live tournament poker this year, and my game is much the better for it. More importantly, I played against a variety of opponents and that forced me to be more flexible in my game. Even tonight, there were only 10 guys at the table, but they ranged from ultra-tight to fairly LAGgy. Seeing so many types of opponents has made me much, much better.

There’s still another TOC in December for the other group I’ve played with this year. As of right now, I’m in line to get a seat in that tournament, but there are three more tourneys before the end of the season. If I still have enough points at the end of the season, I may fly back to play that TOC as well.

$45 tournament recap

Saturday I played a $45 buy-in tournament. We started with 10K in chips with 30-minute levels and 25 players.

This tournament was very difficult for me both physically and psychologically. It began exactly 12 hours after Friday night’s tournament ended, so I had very little time to sleep and refocus my mind. Early in the tourney, I was splashing around a lot more than I usually do, but I was playing very well post-flop. I made some good laydowns, some strong bluffs and was generally making good reads. Because I was messing around so much pre-flop and because my table was playing pretty loose poker, my stack constantly fluctuated for the first couple hours or so. Usually, my stack will slowly increase as the tournament progresses, so this was a pretty unique tournament for me. It turns out one downside to being tired in a tourney is that I can’t remember a lot of the hands I played, so I’m only going to highlight the significant ones here (there weren’t too many).

After the first couple hours, I was down to about 4/5 of my starting stack and I was looking to make a move to accumulate some chips. The blinds were starting to creep up on me and I didn’t want to get short-stacked. I think the blinds were 150/300 and I had about 8500 in chips. A couple players limped in front of me and I limped in the CO with QTs. The button and both blinds came along as well. The flop was AQ3 with two hearts, giving me middle pair, medium kicker, second-nut flush draw and a backdoor straight draw. Everyone checked to me and I decided I wanted to get all my chips in, but I had to figure out the best way to do it. The pot was around 1500-1800 chips, so moving in (for about 8200) would be a huge overbet. I could check-raise, but 1) I wasn’t sure the player behind me would bet, even if he hit the board and 2) if he only bet about half the pot, I would be overbetting if I moved in. I decided the bet/three-bet all-in would be my best option, and I could always push the turn if he just called my bet and didn’t raise. I realize this sounds contradictory–I didn’t want to check-raise because the button may not bet; I was betting hoping he’d raise so I could move in–but I put him on an Ace-rag and he really liked pretty much any Ace that he flopped. My reasoning was that he would probably check behind to trap with his Ace (never mind that it was a multi-way pot and that his kicker probably wasn’t any good), but he would raise for value if I bet. Anyway, I had to pick the right amount to bet so that if he raised me 1) my re-raise all-in would be significant enough that he’d have to consider folding if his kicker was trash and 2) he’d be making a mathematical mistake if he folded. I decided to bet 1200 (leaving me with about 7K), figuring he’d raise to about 3600, so I could push another 3400. Given the stack sizes, this last 3400 would actually be pretty significant to him because it’d be the different between him having a short-to-medium stack and him being crippled. So, I bet 1200, he raised to 4000, I moved in for about 3500 more and he called pretty quickly. Turns out my read was right, but his kicker was a three, so he had Aces up and I was only about 40% to win the hand (maybe a bit less). I got luck to spike a heart on the turn to double up to around 17K.

We broke for the final table not too much later. The first big hand I played at the FT was a pre-flop semi-bluff gone wrong, then being salvaged. I was in MP3 with 89s and made the standard raise to 3 BB (I had been playing pretty tight, so I thought I could steal the blinds). Both the CO and button cold-called my bet and we had three to the flop. Obviously, I’m not thrilled that both of these players called my bet, but I do have a pretty 89s, so I could flop pretty big. Flop was TT7r, giving me an OESD. Still, I didn’t like my hand against JJ or QQ, so I checked it to see what they’d do. I was prepared to exercise each of my three options (call, fold, raise) depending on who bet and how strong I felt he was. Both of them checked. Now I’m thinking 1) Sweet! I get a free shot at my OESD and 2) Both of them must have a couple big cards, which means I can steal this on the turn if a blank rolls off. The turn was an 8, making the board TT87r, and giving me middle pair and an OESD. I bet out 1/2 the pot and both players folded. I think I added 30% to my stack this hand.

I folded for quite a while and occasionally stole the blinds to build my stack to about 27K. Then I got AKs (clubs) UTG and raised it to 3 BB (2400 chips at the 400/800 level). The CO called and everyone else folded. The CO could have a pretty wide range of hands here–ATs+, 66+, KTs+, QJ–but I have most of them dominated, so I wasn’t really worried about his call. I also knew he was an aggressive player, so my plan was to check-raise the flop if I hit it, but just lead out at the flop for a standard c-bet if I missed. Flop was KQ7 with two spades (KQ). This is good news and bad news because it’s a good flop for my hand, but it hit KQ perfectly and KQ is definitely in his range. I decided to stick with my plan, but if he re-raised me all-in on the flop, I’d have a decision to make. I checked, intending to raise, and he bet out for about half the pot (2400). I raised to 9K total and he thought for quite a while before calling. Now, I’m pretty sure he’s either on a flush draw, a straight draw, has a weak King, weak Queen or he has KQ. I really didn’t feel like his call was very strong, so I pretty much discounted KQ. My plan was to push if a non-straightening/non-spade hit the turn. The turn was the 3c (perfect card for my hand), so I moved in (I had him covered, so my bet was reduced to about 13.5K). He went into the tank (obviously he doesn’t have KQ), and took a long time to think it over. Several times he said things like, “Y’all will think I’m a donkey if I show this hand.” Eventually, he made the call. “Spade draw?” “No.” “King Queen?” “No.” And he turned over KJo, meaning I was about 94% to win the hand. The river was a Jack and we have our new chip leader; I’m crippled with about 4.5K remaining. He said he put me on a flush draw. I’m going to break this hand down a little further because it was a big hand on a lot of levels.

First, I just want to look at it from a purely theoretical poker standpoint. This was my seventh tournament with this group of guys and this was my sixth final table. They’ve seen me play and I have a generally tight, aggressive image. It’s true that I play a lot of junk from time to time, but I rarely show it, so they normally see me show good cards. So, my table image should be pretty tight-aggressive and I’m UTG at a full (9-handed) table. I raised it to 3 BB and everyone folded to him. Now, I assume that he’s putting me on a range of hands here (this may not be a valid assumption), and I’d say my range is probably AJs+, 88+ and that’s about it. Really, that’s probably a little loose… I’m not sure I’d raise with AJs UTG in this situation, but I’m giving him the benefit of the doubt. So, there are 10 hands I could have and he’s totally dominated by six of them, but he has a race against four of them. This is an easy fold unless he’s sure I could be making a move and raising with junk. Ok, so he calls and we take a flop of KQ7 with two spades. This is either a very good or very bad result for him. He’s either just won a race against 88-TT, gotten lucky against AQ, AJ, JJ or he’s in very bad shape. The one exception would be if I had AJ of spades, which would’ve given me a royal flush draw with an overcard (15 outs), and would make me a slight favorite. So, I check (good for him) and he bets 2400, which is 1/2 the pot, and I check-raise him to 9K (about 3.5 times his bet). This is very, very bad for his hand. I’m saying I have him beat and, if I’m telling the truth, he’s drawing very slim. I’m representing AA, KK, QQ or AK, and the best-case scenario is that he has 5 outs to beat my AA. Worst case, he’s drawing dead to KK or to runner-runner Kings against QQ. So… he calls. At this point, he has to put me on a total bluff or a semi-bluff (as I mentioned earlier, the only legitimate semi-bluffing hand I could have is AJ of spades). The turn was the 3c, which was a total blank. I gave it a little thought, then moved all-in. So, what do I have? My range of hands pretty much has to be AA, KK, QQ, AK or AJ of spades…or a total bluff. He’s drawing live against AA and AK (barely) and he’s in decent shape against AJs although he’ll still lose about 30% of the time if that’s my hand. I feel that, even though he has top pair, decent kicker, this is a pretty easy laydown. I’ve had lots of opportunities to back down and show weakness and I’ve shown maximum strength on each occasion (raised pre-flop, check-raised flop and moved in on the turn). I guess he had just decided I was on a flush draw and he called off all his chips as a 94% dog.

Second, this hand was very interesting to me on a psychological level. I had a very good read on my opponent throughout the hand and I went with my read until all my chips were in the pot. I read him as having a moderate hand all the way, and I was confident that he wasn’t trapping me. Also, I think my success in this hand (up until the river card) came from me playing the player instead of the cards. Once he called my pre-flop raise, I had a plan for the flop–I’ll check-raise if I make top pair; I’ll c-bet if I miss the board. I knew he was aggressive and I knew he over-valued paint and medium Aces. I did well to follow through with my plan on the flop, but I also added a caveat on the fly after I saw the board–I decided that if he re-raised me after I check-raised, I would allow myself to fold the hand and concede that he had either KQ or QQ. I played the hand cautiously, but perfectly and got myself into a huge +EV situation. Finally, I kept my cool after he hit his three-outter on the river. I didn’t make any comments, I didn’t berate him, I didn’t give any snide looks to the other players, I just knocked the table and said, “Nice hand.” I didn’t go on tilt or allow it to affect my play. After the hand, I had an M of less than 4, but I managed to last another hour through solid short-stack play.

I doubled up a few hands after the beat with AK vs. AQ and that put my M at about 7. I busted about 50 minutes later when I ran my AJ into the BB’s 99 and I couldn’t outrun him. I finished 8/25 and didn’t cash.

$50 tourney recap

I just got back from a $50 tourney where I took 2nd of 33 players for a $400 prize after about seven hours of play. I don’t feel like writing a full recap yet,

but I played very, very well… until we got heads-up when I goofed and got it all in with A5 vs. AK. Other than that hand, I played great poker all night in

spite of having crummy cards.

Here are the good hands I got: AA (2), 99 (2), 88, 66 (2), AJs, ATo, KQs, KQo. The first pair of Aces stole the blinds pretty early in the tourney. I folded one pair of nines after an all-in and a call in front of me, I folded a pair of sixes to an all-in and the ATo didn’t hold up against 43o. I was only all-in twice in the tourney and I played a pretty solid small ball strategy.

I have a $45 tourney in 12 hours, so I should get some rest.

Early in the tourney, I played a lot of small ball. It worked out pretty well because my table was pretty solid all around. I didn’t really have any big hands, but there were three pretty interesting hands that really set the tone for this tournament.

First hand was a blind battle in the second level (25/50). I completed with K4o and the BB checked. I’ve played with the BB before and he made the FT in the $500 tournament I played in New Orleans earlier this year. He’s pretty aggressive, won’t be pushed around and plays solid poker. In this hand, his solid play actually helped me out a lot because it allowed me to deduce his hand (or at least deduce what wasn’t in his hand). Also, it allowed me to think on the third or fourth level. The flop came down something like Axx, I bet 3/4 the pot and he called. I didn’t put him on an Ace since he didn’t raise pre-flop or on the flop. The turn was a Ten and it went check, check. The river was a blank, I checked and he bet 2/3 pot. I had to think about it for a while because he could’ve paired one of his cards, but I figured he didn’t have an Ace because he didn’t raise pre-flop or on the flop. He didn’t have a Ten because he checked the turn. I figured he wouldn’t value bet anything less (if he’d paired a small card on the board), so we was likely bluffing. I called, my King-high beat his Queen-high and I took it down while the rest of the table laughed at us. I think we were both legitemately playing for high card here. He almost had to bet the river in case I had hit a pair by accident, but he knew I didn’t have a Ten or an Ace.

A few orbits later, we played a very similar hand and my Jack-high ended up beating his Ten-high to win the pot. This time, there was a pair on the board, but the betting was similar except I think he gave up after the turn.

Later in the 50/100 level, a middle position player, who I know to be pretty aggressive, raised to 3 BB on my BB. Everyone folded to me and I called with KTo. The flop was AQx and it went check, check. The turn was another Queen, I checked, he bet half the pot, I called. The river was a blank (I think the final board was AQ5Q2) and I checked to him. He bet about 3/4 of the pot and I took a while to think about it before calling. I figured he either had 88, 99 or a medium suited connector (78, 89, 9T, TJ). I decided my King-high might be good, so I called and took it down against his T9 of hearts. The best part about these hands was that I was building an image that I couldn’t be bluffed, so players would leave my blind alone and try to stay out of my way.

Next time I was in the BB, MP1 limped, a late position player limped, the SB completed and I checked with Q4o. The flop was 752r, the SB checked, I checked and was surprised when everyone else checked also. The turn was a Two, making the board 7522, the SB checked again, and I decided I would represent a weak Five, so I bet out. Only the MP1 limper called me. This sort of confused me since I figured he would’ve bet the flop if he’d been limping with a big pair, so he probably had a couple big cards. I thought maybe he had something like 99 and he was concerned I got lucky with that Two, so he was trying to keep the pot small. The river was a Five and, since I’d represented the Five on the turn, I figured I should continue my bluff. I bet about 3/4 the pot and he thought a long time before he called with AK. When he called, I looked back at the board and realized the river was a Six, not a Five, so I shouldn’t have bet. I was playing specifically to get him to lay down 88 or 99, so that Five looked like a good card for me… except it wasn’t a Five. At our next break, the guy told me he had a tell on me and that’s why he called. I am aware of this tell and it was kind of him to let me know he’d seen it. It’s something I need to work on and I think I may have a solution, but I’ll have to give it some time. Ultimately, he made a very good call with AK on a pretty scary board (considering I was in the BB and the board was all low cards).

During the 75/150 level, we were eight handed and I raised it MP1 with KJo. This was more or less a bluff as I felt I needed to raise because I hadn’t made many (maybe any) raises so far. I’d been playing tight, but mostly just hadn’t gotten any cards and I was afraid my table image would keep me from getting any action if I raised with a big hand. Only the BB called (which made me a little nervous) and the flop came down something like T9x with two diamonds (I didn’t have any diamonds). He checked and, against my better judgment, I threw out a half-pot c-bet. I actually almost checked, but I resisted my instincts and bet anyway. This was a mistake as he check-raised me and I had to throw my hand away. In fact, I folded my hand face up and mentioned that I should’ve checked because I missed the flop. I wanted the table to see that 1) I wasn’t raising with total junk and 2) I had decided that maybe I should check with big cards that miss the flop. The second point would allow me to slowplay or bluff scare cards later if I checked the flop.

The next level was the 100/200 level and I only remember one hand from that level. This hand ultimately got me to the final table. I think I started the hand with around 7K or so. It was folded around to the CO (same opponent who check-raised me in the previous hand) who made it 600 to go. I looked down at 88 and decided that 1) My hand was probably good and 2) If it wasn’t any good, I’d like to know before we go any further. I raised it up to 1600 hoping to take it down right there, but also ready to play after the flop. The CO just called, so I put him on a couple big cards or maybe 99, TT or JJ. The flop came down JT8 with two clubs. The good news was that I’d flopped a set, but the bad news was I didn’t think this hit his hand. If he had AK, AQ or KQ, he had missed and would probably fold if I bet (with the exception of KQ, but I didn’t think that hand very likely). I checked and he checked behind. I thought that was a little strange as there was quite a bit of money out there and I figured he’d take a stab at it if he missed. I thought it was possible he was slowplaying, or he just didn’t want to get trapped. If he was slowplaying, I’d just have to go broke unless a really scary card came off on the turn (9 of clubs, for instance). I was hoping an Ace would come off on the turn since that would likely make his hand. My plan was to check-raise if an Ace or King hit the turn, but to bet out if anything else hit. Sure enough, an Ace came off on the turn. I checked, he bet about 2500 and I check-raised all-in. He called very quickly, which made me think he could have a set. Turns out he had AJ and I doubled up to just over 15K.

Just as that hand was happening, there were two new guys moving to our table and several people were gathered around watching the hand. I thought that might gain me a little psychological edge. Right after the break, we played around and I got a walk the first time I had the BB. Both of the new guys (I’ve played with them both several times before) said, “Oh man, y’all are just folding around to this guy? We can’t have that. Get ready to play poker, fellas!” Ironically, they were the button and small blind, so they were technically the ones who should’ve been challenging my blind (of course they knew that). Anyway, I said, “Oh yeah, we forgot to tell you that we’re doing a new thing at this table. Basically, whenever it’s my blind, everyone just folds to me. And when I’m in the small blind, everyone folds so the two blinds can fight it out with King high and stuff. We’re playing high-card poker over here.”

Not too much later, I got AA UTG, raised to 3 BB and everyone folded. Oops. I worked a little too hard at building a “don’t mess with me” table image. Time to start raising more hands.

Unfortunately, my cards totally dried up for the next few levels. I made a “raise the limpers” move from the BB with 96s once to pick up a nice pot and occasionally stole the blinds, but I mostly just watched my stack dwindle. Then, all of a sudden, we were at the final table. I was one of the shorter stacks at the table, but I wasn’t desperate. Also, I’d played with all these guys before, so I didn’t need as much time to take a read on them.

I should note that there was an interesting factor that drastically affected play at this particular final table: This was the last tournament before a “Tournament of Champions” (TOC). The TOC is a one-table freeroll tournament that the league’s point-leaders get to play. The prize pool was to be about $2500, so it’s a pretty significant freeroll. There were several players (probably four) at the table who needed points to lock up a spot in the TOC. I was one of them, but I was also pretty sure I’d locked up my seat just by making this FT. Obviously, these players would be playing first to move up in the “money” to earn more points; they would be playing second to actually win this tourney. I quickly identified the players who needed points since I knew they’d be easier to push off of hands.

One of the first hands, I was in the BB with KJo. The CO (an aggressive, but cautious player) raised it to 3 BB and everyone folded to me. I knew that he could be making this raise with a lot of hands and he was trying to move up in the points. I looked down at KJo and moved in. I think it’s important to note that I did not think I had a better hand than he did. What I did think was that he wouldn’t call without a very, very big hand (AQ+, TT+) because he needed to move up to get points. I needed chips and this seemed like a good time to get them. He eventually folded KQs face-up saying, “I’m folding the same hand you have, but it’s just not worth it.”

I did a lot of folding for a long time. I folded some good hands that I normally wouldn’t have, but every decision I made ended up either being correct pre-flop (because I was dominated) or post-flop (because I would’ve lost a race). I think the biggest laydown I made was when MP1 moved in (for about half my chips), then MP2 called (for about 2/3 MP1’s bet) and I had 99. I knew that I could only lose half my chips here, and I knew that MP1 had a pretty wide range for moving in here. I also knew that MP2 probably had a pretty wide range. I decided that my best case scenario was to be “racing” against at least three and maybe four overcards, which meant I’d lose the pot between 60 and 70% of the time. Also, there were still five players left to act and I didn’t want to risk running into a big pair. I decided to fold and save my chips for a situation when I could at least have some first-in vigorish. Turns out my opponents had AQ and AJ and I would’ve lost as an Ace hit the turn. I’m not positive this was the right laydown, but I knew there would be opportunities to get some easy chips, so I figured I’d just wait for those.

As it turned out, I would need these “easy chips” to keep afloat while I waited for cards. I mostly just made moves to pick up dead money for a while. I did flop top two pair for a nice pot, but other than that I just stole blinds occasionally. Eventually, my stack shrunk to about six blinds, so I was looking for a place to double up. The player to my right was also short (though he had me covered) and moved in from the CO after everyone else folded. I looked down at 66 and moved in behind him. I figured we were racing, but odds were that I had the lead, so I needed to take the chance. Turns out he had 22 and I doubled up. I was till pretty short, but not as desperate as before.

I folded for a while until I picked up 99 in the BB. Everyone folded to the SB, who had been pretty aggressive and was often all-in. He moved in and I insta-called. He had AJ and I managed to win the race, so I had a decent chip stack. This was a nice result since many of his chips came from a previous race where his KJ beat my ATs.

By now, I had a pretty healthy stack and I could make the occasional move. As it turns out, I didn’t need to do anything fancy. I was dealt AA UTG, made a standard raise and had a late position player move in. Of course I called and his AK didn’t improve, so I was now one of the chip leaders with about four players left.

It seemed like nothing much happened and then we were heads-up. The other player had been catching cards and knocking people out. We basically had even stacks. First hand of heads-up he took it down with a pair. Second hand, he folded his SB to me. Third hand was pretty ugly:

I was in the SB and looked down at A5o. The blinds were 4K/8K with a 500 ante, so I raised to 20K. He moved in on me pretty quickly and I insta-called. As soon as I called, I knew I’d made a mistake because he was a very tight player. My main problem was that I had underestimated our stack sizes (we had just colored up) and I thought we each had about 60K. I insta-called because I figured I was getting about 2:1 on my money, and I’d be short-stacked if I folded. Turns out I was only getting 1.5 or 1.6:1 and I would’ve still had about 60K chips if I folded. I think that I was tired and just acted hastily, but I ended up getting my money in as a 3:1 dog and busting out. It was frustrating because I thought I had a reasonable chance at winning heads-up. Also, I think my opponent may have chopped if I’d suggested it.

So, I ended up taking 2nd of 33 players for $400. Also, I earned a seat in the TOC, so I’m freerolling for a portion of about $2500.

Some of my MTT philosophy

I’ve been playing poker online for about two years now, and I’ve always had a thing for MTTs. I’m sure I’m just another product of the TV poker boom, but I just like MTTs more than cash games (and SNGs are a close second). Here are a few things I’ve learned about MTTs since I started playing:

  • The goal in an MTT is to make it very, very deep into the money. Because of the top-heavy payout structure of most MTTs, it’s hardly worth while to just cash in an MTT. If I’m just playing to cash, my time is probably better spent in a SNG where I can play for less time and cash more frequently than in MTTs.
  • Variance is very high in MTTs. A good MTT player can expect to cash in 10-20% of the tourneys he plays (and this number is inversely proportional to the size of the field). This means that, even for a good player, there is an 80-90% chance that he will lose money in any given tournament. This means that a streak of 10, 15, 20 or more tournaments without cashing is not only possible, but should be expected. This means that my bankroll-to-buy-in ratio must be very high to withstand the negative variance in MTTs. I try to make sure I have at least 100 buy-ins for whatever level I’m playing.
  • My opponents determine how many levels of thinking I use; I should be thinking one level ahead of my opponent. Typically, the higher the buy-in, the more levels of thought necessary to be a winner (to an extent). In the lower buy-ins, there’s generally no point in thinking to the fourth level, or even the third. I think about my hand, I think about my opponents’ hands, and that’s it unless I have reason to believe that my opponents are trying to read my hand. A couple weekends ago, I played an MTT where I tried an elaborate check-raise bluff against an opponent who obviously had me beat. I was representing a hand that had him in bad shape, but because he was only thinking about his hand and wasn’t trying to put me on a hand, I donked off a bunch of my chips. I was thinking on the third level, but he was only thinking on the first level, so I was just wasting brain power and chips. After the hand, a more experienced player at the table said, “Nice bet, I would’ve folded to you there.” My check-raise bluff would’ve worked against this opponent because he was thinking on the second level, but my play was too fancy for a player thinking only on the first level. But the more experienced opponent was wrong, it wasn’t a nice bet because I made it against the wrong type of player.
  • Keeping records is imperative. I record every tournament I play: Buy-in, number of entrants, where I finished, how much I won, how long it took, and various notes on my play. I keep track of my overall ROI, how often I cash (ITM–In The Money percentage), and other statistics that help me see how well I’m playing. These records enable me to measure my progress, expose any leaks in my game and, most importantly, they keep me honest. The records don’t lie–if they say I’m winning, I’m winning; if they say I’m losing, I’m losing.
  • Hand Histories are a very big part of my learning process. When I go very deep in an MTT, I’ll often review the hand history the following day to see what I did well and what I could’ve done better to win. Any time I encounter a difficult hand, I save the hand history from that hand so I can look over it and get feedback from other experienced players to help me understand the hand better, so I’m more prepared for that scenario next time I see it. If I have a bad session, I’ll look at the big picture to see if there are any leaks I need to work on, or to see if maybe I was just running bad.

I’m not an MTT expert, not even close. But I have been consistently improving over the past several months and I believe these are the primary reasons.

Good weekend of poker

I had a pretty good weekend at the poker tables. Nothing incredible, but I had decent results.

I played a total of 12 tournaments–11 online and one live. I cashed in four of them and made one final table (the live tourney was a one-table tournament, so no final table points for that one). My online ROI was 140% and my live ROI was 243% for a total weekend ROI of 171%. It was nice to have a good weekend online since it had been over three weeks since I cashed in any tournaments.

All in all, I played very well this weekend and I think the results don’t reflect my performance. I made some very good plays and those plays allowed me to accumulate chips to weather some pretty bad beats. My instincts were good and I played solid, patient poker. I’m also playing very well on the bubble, and not playing to eke into the money (I busted 245 in one tournament where 243 paid when I made a good situational play and just got unlucky; I could’ve easily folded into the money).

In 12 tournaments, I lost 10 all-ins where I was at least a 75% favorite when the money went in. That’s just a rough run of luck and I was pretty fortunate to survive as many times as I did.

This was a pretty interesting hand from one of my online tournaments: We were down to 245 (of 1405) players and 243 spots paid. I had about 5K chips and the blinds were at 200/400-25 (or something like that). It was folded around to two off the button who raised it to 1200 and the CO smooth-called. Both players had stacks about like mine, but maybe a little bit deeper. Since we were on the bubble, and it was folded around to the hijack, he could have a very wide range of hands. Even a tight player will be raising a reasonable range of hands there (I’d say at least ATs+, KJ+, 77+) and a good player will be raising with a lot more hands. The smooth-call by the button smelled like AK to me, but there are a few lesser hands he could have (AQ, KQs, maybe a medium pair). It’s easy to restrict his range so much because of his stack-size. If he had a really big hand (JJ+) he would almost have to re-raise given the stack-sizes and the fact that there are still three players to act behind him. If he had a mediocre hand (AT, AJ, 55, KT, QJ), he’d almost have to fold for the same reasons. I had 99 on the button and moved in. The blinds folded, the original raiser moved in (uh oh) and the CO called (double uh oh). The original raiser had JJ and CO had AK. JJ held up and I was out.

I was pretty upset with my play after this hand but, the more I think it, the more I think it was the right play. Hijack’s JJ was a much better hand than he needed to raise there, and my read that the CO had AK was accurate. Most of the time, my all-in will isolate me against the CO getting 7-to-5 on my money as a 55% favorite.

I think the AK really misplayed his hand here. He ended up calling off his whole stack with AK, sandwiched between a raiser and a re-raiser. AK is a good hand, but it’s the kind of hand that I want to make the last move with. If he’s going to play AK in that spot (and he should), then he needs to move in to isolate against the initial raiser. If I had folded, the SB would’ve been getting about 3.4-to-1 to call. If the SB had folded, the BB would’ve been getting about 4.25-to-1 to call. Those are tempting odds for the blinds to call and get lucky. The bottom line is that he should be playing this hand for all his chips (his M is only about 8 before the hand starts) and AK is a hand best played heads-up.

EDIT: I played again tonight (Monday) and had a pretty decent night. I played three tourneys and made one final table (took third). Of course, I busted from one tourney when I got the money in as better than a 70% favorite, but that seems to be standard. My overall ROI for the night was almost exactly 100%.

$70 tourney recap

I don’t typically do my recap immediately after a tournament, but this one will be so short, I might as well get it out of the way.

During the first two levels, my table was doing a lot of limping, so I joined the party. I made trips twice (once with A8o on a board with two Eights, once with A4s on a board with two Aces) and won medium pots with both of them. I also flopped a lot of big draws (two nut flush draws, two OESDs to the nut straight) in big, multi-way pots, but didn’t hit any of them. I turned a double gutshot straight draw once and bluffed the river, but got called by second pair. I was just below even after the first two levels.

Blinds were 100/200 and I was in the CO with KQs. MP1 raised it to 600 and I flat-called. Everyone else folded. Flop was JT9 with two spades. He checked, I checked. Turn was a 6. He checked, I bet 700, he called. River was a 6. If he bet, I would just call since I thought it was possible he was slowplaying a set. Instead, he checked, I bet 1K, he called. He said he had AJo. This hand put me up to about 16.5K.

Blinds were 100/200 and I had TT in the BB. Three people limped (all very loose players), the SB completed and I raised it to 1200 total. The first two limpers (MP1 and MP2) called and everyone else folded. The flop was A8x. I hated to see that Ace as I was sure at least one of my opponents had an Ace. I decided to check and see what happened. I basically planned to fold, but I was open to other options. MP1 checked, MP2 bet out 1K and it was back to me. I took a read on MP2 that he was weak and it looked to me like MP1 had a weak Ace and that he didn’t like MP2’s bet. I decided to check-raise bluff to 4K total with the intention of getting MP1 to fold he scared Ace and MP2 to fold because he was bluffing. Sure enough, MP1 folded, but MP2 called. I’m done with the hand if no Ten comes off. Turn was a Queen and we went check, check. River was another King and we went check, check. He showed down A9o. I was pretty shocked that 1) he called pre-flop for 6 BB and 2) that he called a large check-raise on the flop. He was obviously looser than I thought. I was down to about 10K.

A few hands later, we went on our first break.

I played one hand in the 200/400 level. Everyone folded to me in the CO and I had A3o. I raised it to 1200 and only the BB called. The flop was AQ9 with two clubs. The BB checked, I bet 1500, he check-raised to 4500 and I folded.

Blinds were 300/600 and I was UTG+1 with AQo. UTG limped, I moved in and everyone folded.

Blinds were 300/600 and everyone folded to me in the BB with KQo. We took our second break a couple hands later.

First hand after the second break, the blinds went up to 500/1000 and we were playing eight-handed. Everyone folded to me on the button and I moved in for about 6000 with K2o. The BB was extremely short-stacked and should’ve called with any two cards, so I normally wouldn’t have moved in in this situation. But, he was a very inexperienced player, so I knew he’d fold most of his hands. Sure enough, he folded and I stole the blinds.

We were seven-handed and the blinds were still 500/1000, I got AQo UTG and moved in for 7400 total. UTG+1 took a couple seconds and said, “I’ll call you.” Everyone else folded to the BB who reluctantly folded (I think he had a small pocket pair). UTG+1 showed ATo. Unfortunately, the flop was KTx and I didn’t improve. I busted 23/33 without ever getting my stack over 16.5K.

I had one pocket pair–TT–and had AQo twice. Other than that, I basically had no cards. It was a very frustrating tournament and I was kind of glad it was over, although busting with AQo vs. ATo isn’t my ideal way to go out. As I think back on the tournament, my biggest enemy was probably the fast blind structture. We started with a generous 15K in chips, but we skipped a lot of blind levels. We started at 25/50 and it went 50/100, 100/200, 200/400, 300/600, 500/1000 and then I busted. So, we skipped the 75/150, 150/300 and 400/800 levels. Starting with 15K chips is nice, but the starting stack is only meaningful in light of the blind structure, which was very fast for this tourney. The only hand I think I might’ve played differently was the TT hand. But even with the 4K chips I check-raised into that pot, I only would’ve had 11.5K before the last hand, which would’ve been an M of almost 8.

$75 tourney recap

$75 tourney recap

I played in an oddly structured tourney tonight. Initially, it was billed as a $50 tourney with a single $25 rebuy, available if a player went broke. We started with 6K in chips and the rebuy was for 6K and was available for the first hour (three levels). It didn’t take too long before a few people were allowed to rebuy a second time, although no one went crazy or anything. After the first hour was up and the rebuy period had ended, we decided to do an optional $25 add-on for 6K more chips.

We started with 20 guys and the final prize pool was about $1650. The top four spots were to pay something like $700, $500, $300, $150.

At the end of the first hour, I had almost exactly my 6K starting stack, so I took the rebuy, which bumped me up to 12K. I knew I had to buckle down since there were a lot of chips in play and this was likely to be a long tourney. Tightening up wasn’t too difficult since I was totally card dead for the first couple hours.

I’ll do a more detailed recap soon, but it basically came down to five people and I was the chip leader with about 1/3 of the chips in play. The blinds were escalating quickly, so we all decided to chop. I proposed that all five of us take fourth place money and then divide the remainder according to chip stack. After about 6.5 hours, I ended up getting $450 of which $20 went to the dealer.

My best hands were as follows: AA, KK, 99, 77, 44, 33(2), AKs, AQ(2), AJ, KQ, KJ, KT. My best made hand a straight at my first table.

First or second hand of the tournament, I was in the BB with 54o. A middle position player, who I know to be pretty loose/aggressive pre-flop, raised it to 3 BB. A couple players called, I called and the flop was 67J. I checked, the pre-flop raiser bet half the pot and only I called. The turn was a 2. I checked, the pre-flop, checked. I had decided he was on a couple big cards and I was going to bet the river if a card Ten or lower came off. The river was an Ace, so I checked and he checked. He showed KQ and took it down with King high. In retrospect, I played this hand a little passively. I really think the correct play is to check-raise him on the flop here since I figured he missed the board. I was in the BB and he knows I’m a tricky player, so I’m pretty sure he would fold without a pair there. As it was, I decided to play it to keep the pot small.

I was getting pretty short-stacked when I picked up AQo UTG+1. I made a raise to 3 BB and the SB called. Flop came down Q93 with two diamonds and the SB checked. I bet out half the pot, he check-raised to three times my bet and I moved all-in. He quickly folded. Another guy at the table made the sounds of a fishing line that just got a bit and he began reeling in his (my) fish. I think I probably moved in a little quickly. I might’ve gotten a call if I thought for a little while before moving in. I think I was just trying to discourage any straight or flush draws from coming along because the pot was already pretty big (relative to my stack) and I just wanted to take it down right there. Anyway, this hand got me a few chips.

A bit later, I got 77 in middle position and raised it to 3 BB. (I should note that I went with 3 BB because the table was playing pretty fast and loose and I knew 2.5 BB wasn’t going to ever steal the blinds. Also, these guys were a little crazy, so I didn’t want to play multi-way pots with them since I had trouble reading their hands. Finally, since we were never going to have antes, the bubble benefit wouldn’t be there for 2.5 BB.) The guy to my immediate left called (he calls a lot and is generally pretty passive) and everyone else folded. The flop came down AKx with two diamonds (I had the seven of diamonds, so at least both of my sevens were live). I hated this flop, especially against this opponent, but I threw out a c-bet anyway. He called pretty quickly and I knew 1) I shouldn’t have c-bet and 2) I was done with the hand unless I made a set. The turn was an offsuite Queen and we both checked. The river was a six of diamonds. I checked, he moved in (for about the size of the pot) and I folded. I was mostly unhappy with myself for c-betting, but I felt I played the rest of the hand ok.

A few hours into the tourney, I was pretty low on chips (as I had been all night) and I got 78 in the BB. Two or three players limped and I checked my option. The flop came down 569r giving me the nut straight and no flush draw onboard. I checked it, an LP, aggro player bet, I called and everyone else folded. The turn paired the board with a 5 (not a scary card for me at all) and I checked it, but the aggro player checked behind. The river was a Ten, I moved in for about the size of the pot and he folded. I normally would’ve value bet, but I figured he either had something like A9o or absolutely nothing. I figured a regular value bet was about as likely to get called as an all-in, so why not maximize value by moving in.

My best hand at my first table was 99 and I just took the blinds with a standard raise.

By the time we got down to the final table, I was pretty short on chips. I think I had around 11K chips and the blinds were 500/1000. That being said, the blind structure was moving slowly (next level would be 600/1200, then 700/1400, then 800/1600), and there were no antes, so I wasn’t feeling too desparate. Also, we had just moved from five-handed to ten-handed, so I had some room to breathe and didn’t feel any pressure to make any crazy moves yet.

Second hand of the final table, I was in the BB. CO and button limped and the SB completed. These are three of the looser players I’ve played with and I knew they could literally have almost anything. I looked down to see AQo and moved all-in. Immediately, they all started hemming and hawing about how automatic that move was and how they saw it coming, sort of implying they thought I could make that move with almost any two cards (which is certainly true). I realized this was a good opportunity to do a little advertising, but not the kind I would normally do. I mucked my hand and, as I raked in the pot, said, “Man, you guys are just makin’ it too easy. I just about doubled-up there!” I wanted them to think I made that move with nothing so I could get action on my big hands if I got them. Because the table was a relatively loose, aggressive table, I knew I’d probably have to catch some cards to get chips, and I wanted to make sure they called me if I hit big. This hand would prove to be pretty important later.

In reality, I had added about 3K to my stack and I was now at about 14K. Two hands later, I was on the button with KQo. Two or three people limped before me and I decided to just call and take a flop. If my stack had been bigger or shorter, I probably would’ve raised, but with an M of about 10, I felt like calling was right. If I missed the flop, I could just fold. If I hit it, there would likely be a bet in front of me and I could move in and get some chips. The SB completed, the BB checked and the flop came down JTx. I decided immediately that my chips were going in the middle, and I hoped someone would bet in front of me to sweeten the pot. Sure enough, The hijack bet out a little more than half the pot. I thought for a second, said, “I raise…”, counted out my chips, threw in his bet amount and then declared all-in. Everyone folded to the original bettor who griped a little before folding. By now, people were starting to joke about how I was moving in a lot. I was thinking about how I had more than doubled-up in four hands at the final table and I hadn’t shown a hand yet.

Next time I was in the BB, I picked up T2s. The button limped, the SB completed and I checked my option. The flop was something like Q54 with two of my suit. I checked, the button bet out, the SB folded and I moved in. The button folded showing K5 (for middle pair). This is pretty standard for me given the situation and the stack sizes. My thinking is as follows: the board is pretty dry (except for the flush draw, which I have), my stack is small, but not tiny

A few orbits later, I was UTG, and picked up Aces, by far my biggest hand of the night (next best was 99 a few hours earlier). I raised it to 3 BB (I’m at a pretty loose table, so I’m not worried about everyone folding and I want as much value as possible from my hand), and got a call from a late position player and the BB. The flop came down A95 with two clubs. Against some players, I’d slowplay this, but I bet out 3 BB instead. Here’s why:

I’ve played with the late position player a lot, and I specifically remember a very similar hand where I raised in early position with AA, flopped a set and slowplayed it. The late position caller in this hand had seen that hand and had even commented on it after it was over. I knew that by betting out, he would at least think it was possible I was weak, whereas he might’ve been cautious if I checked it. I also had a read on the BB and I know that 1) he over-values weak Aces, 2) he will check-raise bluff with nothing or sometimes bottom pair and 3) he doesn’t seem to put enough emphasis on position, so I thought it likely he would not give me credit for Aces or even a big hand. In short, I thought there was a great chance I’d get action (especially from the BB) if I bet out, so why not build the pot?

So anyway, I bet out 3 BB (intentionally under-betting the pot to look weak), the late position player folded and the BB started talking: “Six thousand, huh? That’s a little small… Do you have an Ace? I don’t think you have an Ace.” He asked me how much I had left and I did a little acting (you know, sad and pensive) as I counted my chips and reported that I had 18K total. He thought for about 30 more seconds before he said, “I’ll put you all-in.” Of course, I beat him in the pot and flipped over the nuts. He immediately mucked and said, “I’m dead.” meaning he had a weaker Ace. I now had about 50K chips and could play some poker.

As it turned out, I wouldn’t be playing all that much poker. I reverted to mediocre cards for quite a while. I tried to steal once with A7s, but got two callers and gave up on the flop (flop was QJTr, not a good flop for that hand). I made a few successful steal attempts, one with AKs. Basically, my chip stack sort of dwindled for about 90 minutes as I played few pots and mostly got blinded down and missed flops.

We were down to seven players and I was a medium stack. There was one big stack, one very, very short stack and the other five of us were medium stacks. I proposed that we chop because the blinds and antes were very large and we were just about to start gambling instead of playing poker. I’m very comfortable with short-stacked poker, but I don’t like leaving the prize pool distribution up to the poker gods. Also, we’d been playing for six hours and only four spots were going to pay. I proposed that we split the money evenly except the short stack just got his buy-in back and the big stack got the remainder of his portion. The five medium stacks would get the same average amount. The big stack declined and I said, “Ok, we’ll just play it out then.” We decided we would play out the next level (2K/4K and there were only 280K chips in play, making the average M less than 7) and then chop it up.

Two hands later, I was in the BB. The CO raised it to 10K, the button called and the SB folded. I looked down at two Kings. I thought for a few seconds and finally moved all-in. The initial raiser didn’t take too long to fold, but the button didn’t seem to want to go away. He asked what I had left, so I counted it all out and put it in the middle. I think it’s important to note that this is very similar to that first hand at the final table where I moved in with AQ after a few limpers. I didn’t show my cards, but I said, “You guys are makin’ it too easy!” as I raked in the chips. The button in this hand was also in that hand and I know he was thinking about that hand as he made his decision. Also, he’s the player I check-raised all-in with my ten-high flush draw earlier (I didn’t show the hand, but I’m sure that he thinks I might be pushing him around by now). He said, “Well, you’ve probably got something, but I know you could be making a move here.” Basically, I got the idea that he wasn’t sure if I was bluffing and he was tired of playing. He called and showed QJo and I busted him. I now had about 75K in chips and was pretty close to the chip lead.

Immediately after the hand, I proposed a chop again. Same as before, but everyone wanted to play out the level.

Next hand, I was in the SB with 73s. Everyone folded to me and I looked at my crummy cards and almost mucked ’em till I realized who was in the BB. He’s probably the tightest player I know and he was extremely short stacked (he started the hand with about 2 BB in front of him). He had just been hanging in there for a couple hours. I literally had almost mucked my cards when I pulled them back, asked what he had left and then put a stack of chips in the middle to set him all-in. He showed 43o and mucked. I showed my 73 and made some joke about having him dominated. I shouldn’t have done that and I wouldn’t have showed my cards, but the guy to my right had seen them when I picked them up to muck them and I felt like I had to show the table. I was mostly interested in stealing the blinds and not in making a fancy move. I just knew that the BB wouldn’t call unless he had a monster, so I realized it didn’t matter what I had.

A couple hands later, the ultra-short stack busted, leaving us with five players. Again, I proposed a chop. This time, my proposal was a little different than before: we all take fourth place money ($150) and chop the rest of it according to chip stacks. Still, everyone wanted to play the level out. By the end of the level, I was chip leader with 94K (of 280K chips in play) because it was obvious people were just hanging out and waiting for the level to end so we could quit. Why not steal some blinds? I asked if anyone had any other proposals and no one did, so we chopped by chip stack. The reason I changed my proposal was that the super short-stack had busted and there were two of us with most of the chips on the table (second place had about 75K).

Poker and diminishing returns

I’ve been meaning to write this for a while, but every time I start to write it I suddenly have an upswing and I chicken out. (Un)Fortunately, I’m on a post-downswing hiatus, so I have a few days to get this right. Here’s the basic idea:

The more poker I play, the more I need to take a break, regardless of how well I’m playing.

Every time I play poker, I make several investments–money, time, attention, etc. Each player only has so much of each commodity to give. I sort of envision a poker player as a combination of all these things (and others), much like racing games where the player can choose a car based on its aggregate of several different attributes–acceleration, top speed, handling, etc. I think everyone knows that if a player is in a cash game and is playing a long session, then the longer he plays past a certain point, the poorer his performance. For some players, their performance worsens after only a few hours, while other players can play their best game for many, many hours and sometimes days.

I saw a fantastic example of this on a recent episode of High Stakes Poker on GSN. Mike Matusow had been playing for several hours and was obviously becoming very fatigued. He told the table that he could feel his play slipping and he knew it was time to quit. What did the table do? They offered him $4000 to continue playing. Mike accepted the bribe (or investment, depending on one’s perspective) and proceeded to dump about $100K, most of it to Phil Laak. Mike is a very good poker player, but he ended up stuck because he continued to invest time and money when his attention had run out.

Each player has a limit to what he can invest before his results stop reflecting his actual poker ability. A good example of this would be multi-tabling cash games online. For a long time, I was 4-tabling low-limit hold ’em games. I was earning just shy of 3BB/100 hands with a sample size of something like 12,000 hands. This is considered pretty good and I figured if I could make 3BB/100 4-tabling, why not bump it to 5 tables and make more money in less time? As it turns out, I’m simply awful if I try to 5-table. I felt rushed, stressed and generally overwhelmed. My results were terrible and I quickly dropped back to 4-tabling where I went back to showing a nice profit. Some players play 8 to 12 tables simultaneously and they show a huge hourly profit. Even for those players, their BB/100 numbers take a hit as they play more tables.

I find that I typically lose the most after I’ve won a lot. A couple weeks ago, I went on a 10-day run where I cashed in 9 of 20 tournaments and made 6 final tables and had a 267% ROI (all of these tournaments had between 180 and 2,000 entrants and cost between $4 and $55). Since then, I’ve played 11 tournaments with 0 cashes and a -100% ROI. I’ve had two near cashes, but generally haven’t even been close. I was tempted to chalk this up to normal variance, but I know that’s not the problem. The problem is that I have gotten bored and I’m having trouble focusing. I’ve invested too much time and my attention span is slipping. I’ve been opening too many pots, playing marginal hands, discounting positional disadvantages and generally getting out of line. I’ve realized that I play very good tournament poker with a big stack and I’m starting to gamble too much as I try to acquire that stack early. Subsequently, my tournament results have suffered and I’ve donked off about 15% of my winnings from my 10-day streak.

So, what’s the point? The point is that, as with other forms of gambling and investing, poker is affected by the Law of Diminishing Returns. I have a very subtle leak in my game–I’m not taking time off when I start to get bored. As I look back over my records, I can see clumps of black where I had a series of nice wins; but after most of those black clumps, there is an extended red clump where I dump off my winnings through poor play. This leak has cost me several hundred dollars and will continue costing me money until I correct it. That’s why I haven’t played in a couple days and I don’t plan on playing again until a live tournament on Friday night. I need a break to allow myself to focus and play my best game.

2.5 is the new 3! (follow-up)

I’ve been using the 2.5 BB standard pre-flop raise for a few weeks now and I’ve got a good idea of its benefits and drawbacks. First, the drawbacks:

Whether I can use this raise seems highly dependant on the table climate. A table full of loose/passive opponents will call too frequently, creating multi-way pots where I’m often playing out of position. This can be frustrating because these opponents’ calling ranges are typically very wide, so I’m out of position, often playing speculative hands and I have no idea what my opponents have. Of course, I’m often making raises with suited connectors and other hands that actually play well in multi-way pots, so I get paid off in a big way when I hit my hand. That being said, I’ve found that if the table is too loose, the best thing to do is revert to a standard solid game and just play good cards against these opponents.

Because I’m opening more pots, people will play back at me more often with re-raises. Here’s an example of a couple hands:

I’m in middle position and make a 2.5 BB raise with QTs. The player to my left flat-calls (he’s been doing this a lot and he’s been doing it with junk). Everyone else folds. The flop is all under cards, I c-bet half the pot, he calls. I know he has nothing, but I also have nothing. Turn is a blank. I check, he checks. River is a Queen, giving me top pair, medium kicker. I bet, he raises, I call. He showed Q9o and I took it down.

Next hand, I made a 2.5 BB raise and everyone folded.

Next hand, I made a 2.5 BB raise with AQo. Everyone folded to the BB who moved in for about five times my initial raise. I insta-called and he showed A9s.

This player was a decent player who had been playing solid poker, but he’d seen me show down a QTs a few hands earlier, then steal the blinds the previous hand, then raise again this hand. After the hand, he told me he didn’t think I was that strong. Unfortunately, he would’ve been correct pretty often. I find myself having to fold to a lot of re-raises from astute players. The good news is it’s only costing me 2.5 BB instead of 3 BB.

Astute players in the BB will often call my raise and bet out almost any flop. I think this is a combination of them noticing I’m playing a lot of hands and the good pot-odds they’re being offered to call my pre-flop raise. This reduces my opportunities to steal, but it also increases my chances of picking off their bluffs. Over time, it becomes obvious that they’re employing a sort of stop-n-go/re-steal move, which is beatable by simply calling with good hands, raising with decent hands and sometimes raising with junk.

And now the advantages:

The biggest advantage is typically on the bubble, after the antes kick in. Even the loosest players begin to tighten up as everyone starts to try and eke into the money, and this is my queue to start raising more liberally and build my stack (even when someone calls my raise, they’ll often check/fold if they miss the flop). In this situation, the 2.5 BB raise gets fantastic odds (there is a level in PokerStars tourneys where a 2.5 BB raise is actually getting paid better than even money because of the ante) and people aren’t generally concerned with the pot-odds when they decide to play or fold.

I think the most important thing I’m learning is this: I have to be able to recognize when it’s ok to raise 2.5 BB and play a lot of hands, but I also need to recognize when that style just ain’t gonna’ fly. I have to be able to change gears depending on table conditions. Yesterday, I was playing a $50+5 tournament on Party Poker and we were just about to hit the bubble when I got moved to a new table. I had an average stack and I really needed to accumulate some chips. I forced myself to tighten up (rather than just trying to steal blinds and antes right off the bat) so I could get a feel for how my new table was playing. Turns out the table was playing fast and loose and there were two or three to the flop almost every hand. Trying to raise and take it (for 2.5 BB or any other amount) just wasn’t going to work. It was frustrating, but I had to buckle down and take what the table would give me. I tightened up, made some good plays and made it down to 37th (of 538) before I finally busted (after maybe being a little aggro with 99 on the button).

A few of the advantages are inherent in the disadvantages I listed above. For instance, people will often play back at me with junk, but I will have a hand and bust them sometimes; I just have to be able to figure out when I’m ahead, so I can call, and when I’m beat, so I can let it go. Also, people will call my pre-flop raises more often because they assume I’m raising with a lot of medium-strength hands. They’re right, except that they go too far in calling with hands like Q9, J8s, etc. If I hit the flop when they do, I’ll often get paid off well if I have them dominated. Also, as I mentioned earlier, I’ll sometimes be playing hands that actually play well in a multi-way pot. When I raise in middle position with 87s, I don’t mind three or four people calling me because I won’t have any trouble dumping the hand if I miss the flop, but my implied odds against that many opponents are huge if I hit the flop hard.

All things considered, I still think the 2.5 BB standard raise is a very effective and useful strategy in many situations. The tricky part is to recognize when it’s a good situation for a smaller pre-flop raise and when a tighter game with larger pre-flop raise is in order.

Another good showing in an online MTT

I played a $5+.50 MTT on PokerStars tonight. I played well, got lucky at the right times, rarely got unlucky and generally had things go my way.

Anyway, this is my biggest cash in an online freeze-out MTT so far. Hopefully I’ll get a win soon.

PokerStars Tournament #28500040, No Limit Hold’em
Buy-In: $5.00/$0.50
1272 players
Total Prize Pool: $6360.00
Tournament started – 2006/07/28 – 20:10:00 (ET)

Dear JoshNjuice,

You finished the tournament in 5th place.
A $286.21 award has been credited to your Real Money account.

315 hands played and saw flop:
– 3 times out of 39 while in small blind (7%)
– 19 times out of 40 while in big blind (47%)
– 32 times out of 236 in other positions (13%)
– a total of 54 times out of 315 (17%)

Pots won at showdown – 19 out of 23 (82%)
Pots won without showdown – 45